We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where risk averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. Our model delivers a rich set of predictions that can account for a wide variety of phenomenon observed in the data including the correlations among firm sizes, wages, health insurance o↵ering rates, turnover rates and workers’ health compositions. We estimate our model by Generalized Method of Moments using a combination of micro datasets including Survey of Income and Program Participation, Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey. We use our estimated model to evaluate the equilibrium impact of the 2010 A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) and find that it would reduce the uninsured rate among the workers in our estimation sample from about 22.34% in the pre-ACA benchmark economy to about 3.67-3.93%. We also find that incomebased premium subsidies for health insurance purchases from the exchange play an important role for the sustainability of the ACA; without the premium subsidies, the uninsured rate would be around 18.19%. In contrast, as long as premium subsidies and health insurance exchanges with community ratings stay intact, ACA without the individual mandate, or without the employer mandate, or without both mandates, could still succeed in reducing the uninsured rates to 7.34%, 4.63% and 9.22% respectively.